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FILLING THE ILLINOIS FEDERAL 
DISTRICT COURT VACANCIES 
Carl Tobias* 
Abstract 
 
President Donald Trump repeatedly argues that appellate court 
appointments constitute his major success.  The President and the 
United States Senate Republican Party majority have established 
records by approving fifty very conservative, young, and capable 
appellate court jurists.  However, their confirmations have exacted 
a toll, particularly from the many federal district courts which ad-
dress seventy-nine unfilled positions in 677 judicial posts.  
One constructive illustration has been the three Illinois tribunals 
which confront five pressing openings.  The Administrative Office of 
the United States Courts classifies three as “emergencies,” because 
the vacant seats have been protracted and involve substantial case-
loads.  Despite this circumstance, Trump failed to nominate any Il-
linois district court candidate before June 2018, while the U.S. Sen-
ate only appointed a nominee more than one year later.  All 
openings lacked nominees until recently, mostly because the White 
House did not resend the Senate three nominees whom Trump had 
proposed last year until May 2019.  
District judges comprise the Illinois federal justice regime’s 
“workhorses” and resolve large dockets, while the ample vacancies 
pressure Illinois district courts and litigants, conditions that epito-
mize the nation.  Thus, the efforts to fill the abundant openings by 
 
 * Williams Chair in Law, University of Richmond.  I wish to thank Margaret Sanner for her 
valuable suggestions, Jane Baber, Emily Benedict, and Jamie Wood for their valuable research, edit-
ing, and suggestions, the Pepperdine Law Review editors for their valuable research, advice, and edit-
ing, Leslee Stone for her exceptional processing, as well as Russell Williams and the Hunton Andrews 
Kurth Summer Research Endowment Fund for their generous, continuing support.  Remaining errors 
are mine alone.  The data which relate to the numbers of nominees, appointees, vacancies, and emer-
gencies were current on December 17, when the piece went to print. 
[Vol. 47: 115, 2019] Filling the Illinois Federal 
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW 
116 
the President, the Senate, and Democratic lawmakers who represent 
Illinois—Senator Richard Durbin, the Minority Whip, and Senator 
Tammy Duckworth—necessitate assessment. 
Part II of this Article recounts the background of judicial selec-
tion, emphasizing the contemporary problem.  Part III surveys the 
practices which Trump and the chamber deploy, detecting that both 
stress the rapid appointment of conservative, young, and competent 
appellate court jurists but downplay district level vacancies.  He 
also limits venerable customs which presidents have implemented.  
The section then evaluates confirmation procedures, finding that the 
Judiciary Committee deemphasizes important traditions, especially 
“blue slips”—which stop nominee consideration, unless both home 
state senators approve candidates—and hearings’ careful arrange-
ment that prior committees had rigorously applied.  
Part IV considers numerous selection practices’ effects, deter-
mining that until November 2019 there were more open district 
court slots than upon Trump’s inauguration.  The emphasis on 
speedily appointing conservative appellate court judges and devia-
tions from important precedents that had long effectively served 
White Houses, Senates, and federal courts are undercutting both 
discharge of the President’s constitutional duties to nominate and 
confirm accomplished district court judges and fulfillment of the 
Senate’s constitutional responsibilities to advise and consent on 
nominees.  The massive number and prolonged nature of vacancies 
concomitantly undermine the judiciary’s responsibility to promptly, 
economically, and fairly treat significant numbers of filings.  How-
ever, assiduous executive branch consultation with the Illinois sen-
ators, who astutely collaborated, directly fostered the expeditious 
appointment of two preeminent Seventh Circuit jurists and the care-
ful nomination, although rather lengthy confirmation, of three able, 
moderate district court nominees.  
The last section proffers suggestions for the future.  Now that 
President Trump has renominated those strong, mainstream district 
nominees—who easily won confirmation—he should meaningfully 
consult with the Illinois senators and revitalize numbers of effica-
cious concepts from which presidents and senators have gleaned 
much benefit, to fill every Illinois vacancy.  The Senate ought to re-
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vive venerable measures, robust hearings, rigorous committee dis-
cussions, and vigorous confirmation debates.  These efforts and suc-
cessfully filling the Illinois empty district positions could supply in-
structive guidance for judicial selection across the United States, 
particularly by showing how ample White House consultation of 
home state senators and careful collaboration by these politicians 
can promote the smooth nomination and appointment of highly 
qualified mainstream appeals court and district court jurists.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
President Donald Trump incessantly asserts that court of appeals confir-
mations are his crowning success.1  The President and the Grand Old Party 
(GOP) Senate majority have created records by appointing fifty extremely 
conservative, young, and competent appellate court jurists.2  Nevertheless, 
their approvals have inflicted costs, especially on the myriad federal districts 
throughout the nation, which face seventy-nine vacant positions among 677 
judgeships.3 
One important example has been the multiple Illinois district courts that 
address five pressing openings.4  The Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts 
classifies three as “judicial emergency” vacancies because the unoccupied 
seats have been prolonged and implicate huge filings.5  Notwithstanding that 
situation, Trump marshaled no choice for any Illinois trial level opening until 
June 2018, while the U.S. Senate only confirmed a district nominee on July 
31, 2019.6  All of the Illinois trial court vacancies were missing nominees until 
recently, mainly because the White House delayed resubmitting to the upper 
chamber three nominees whom the administration had proffered last year until 
this May.7 
District jurists constitute the Illinois federal justice system’s “work-
horses” and treat enormous caseloads, while the abundant openings pressure 
Illinois courts, litigants, and lawyers, circumstances that exemplify the na-
tion.8  Thus, the initiatives proposed by the Democratic senators who represent 
 
 1. See, e.g., Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Sept. 16, 2019, 4:21 AM),  
https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/1173557467290247168?lang=en. 
 2. Federal Judges Nominated by Donald Trump, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/Fed-
eral_judges_nominated_by_Donald_Trump (last visited Oct. 22, 2019). 
 3. See Judicial Vacancies, U.S. CTS., https://www.uscourts.gov/judges-judgeships/judicial-va-
cancies (last updated Nov. 11, 2019) (documenting seventy-nine vacancies for federal district courts 
in the United States). 
 4. Current Judicial Vacancies, U.S. CTS. (Oct. 29, 2019), https://www.uscourts.gov/judges-
judgeships/judicial-vacancies/current-judicial-vacancies (last updated Nov. 11, 2019). 
 5. Judicial Emergencies, U.S. CTS. (Oct. 29, 2019), https://www.uscourts.gov/judges-judge-
ships/judicial-vacancies/judicial-emergencies (last updated Nov. 11, 2019). 
 6. Martha Maria Pacold, FED. JUDICIAL CTR. (Oct. 29, 2019), https://www.fjc.gov/his-
tory/judges/pacold-martha-maria; Mary Rowland, FED. JUDICIAL CTR. (Oct. 29, 2019), 
https://www.fjc.gov/history/judges/rowland-mary-margaret. 
 7. See Federal Judges Nominated by Donald Trump, supra note 2. 
 8. See generally Judicial Vacancies, ABA, https://www.americanbar.org/advocacy/governmen-
tal_legislative_work/priorities_policy/independence_of_the_judiciary/judicial_vacancies (last up-
dated Nov. 1, 2019) (“When there are insufficient judges to handle the workload, resolution of these 
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Illinois—Senator Richard Durbin, the Minority Whip, and Senator Tammy 
Duckworth—to fill these ample vacancies need consideration. 
Part II of this Article reviews the history of judicial appointments, stress-
ing the modern conundrum.  Part III scrutinizes the procedures which Trump 
and the chamber employ, indicating that both emphasize the speedy appoint-
ment of conservative, young, and capable appellate jurists but deemphasize 
trial court openings.  He also restricts venerable conventions which presidents 
have instituted.  The segment then analyzes confirmation practices, ascertain-
ing that the Judiciary Committee downplays salient traditions, particularly ap-
pellate court “blue slips”—which halt nominee processing unless home state 
politicians approve candidates—and hearings’ careful scheduling that earlier 
panels had robustly applied. 
Part IV canvasses various procedures’ impacts, detecting relatively more 
empty district slots than upon Trump’s inauguration.  The focus on rapidly 
appointing conservative appellate court jurists and departures from significant 
precedents that had long effectively served the judiciary are undermining both 
fulfillment of the President’s constitutional responsibilities to nominate and 
confirm able trial court judges and discharge of the Senate’s constitutional 
responsibilities to advise and consent.  The mammoth quantity and protracted 
character of vacancies undercut the judiciary’s duty to expeditiously, inexpen-
sively, and equitably resolve large caseloads.  However, active White House 
consultation with the Illinois senators, who adeptly cooperated, did promote 
the swift approval of two prominent Seventh Circuit jurists and the cautious 
nomination and confirmation, albeit rather prolonged, of three accomplished, 
mainstream district choices. 
The last segment posits suggestions for the future.  Now that President 
Trump has renamed those highly competent, moderate district nominees—
who smoothly earned approval—he ought to meticulously consult with the 
Illinois politicians and revive numerous efficacious ideas, from which chief 
executives and senators have derived considerable benefit, to fill all of the 
remaining Illinois district court openings.  The Senate must revitalize con-
structive devices—principally rigorous hearings, salutary panel discussions, 
and robust confirmations debates.  These actions generally and eliminating 
the Illinois unoccupied judicial slots could provide an informative roadmap 
 
important kinds of cases is delayed.  Persistent vacancies in a busy court increase the length of time 
that litigants and businesses wait for their day in court and increase case backlogs that perpetuate 
delays in the future. . . .  These pressures, if left unchecked, inevitably will alter the delivery and qual-
ity of justice and erode public confidence in our federal judicial system.”). 
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for the nation, especially by demonstrating how avid White House consulta-
tion of home state politicians and vigorous cooperation by those senators may 
facilitate the expeditious nomination and confirmation of well qualified, 
mainstream appellate court and district court judges. 
II. MODERN SELECTION PROBLEMS 
The background to modern judicial selection problems deserves cursory 
recounting; other writers have already evaluated the relevant history, and the 
current situation has more relevance.9  One important attribute is the persistent 
vacancies difficulty, which results from enhanced federal court jurisdiction, 
cases, and seats.10  The other contemporary dilemma is political and can be 
ascribed to contrasting White House and Senate control which arose four dec-
ades ago. 
A. Persistent Vacancies 
Lawmakers enlarged federal court jurisdiction beginning in the 1960s,11 
expanding civil actions while federalizing more criminal activity, initiatives 
which propelled district litigation.12  Congress responded to growing case-
loads with more judicial slots.13  Over the fifteen years after 1980, judicial 
 
 9. E.g., MILLER CTR. OF PUB. AFFAIRS, IMPROVING THE PROCESS OF APPOINTING FEDERAL 
JUDGES: A REPORT OF THE MILLER CENTER COMMISSION ON THE SELECTION OF FEDERAL JUDGES 3 
(1996); Gordon Bermant et al., Judicial Vacancies: An Examination of the Problem and Possible So-
lutions, 14 MISS. C. L. REV. 319, 320–23 (1994). 
 10. This attribute merits less comprehensive assessment—delay is intrinsic to the judicial selection 
process, resists easy solution, and has received considerable treatment.  Bermant et al., supra note 9, 
at 333; The Comm. of Fed. Courts, Remedying the Permanent Vacancy Problem in the Federal Judi-
ciary: The Problem of Judicial Vacancies and Its Causes, 42 RECORD ASS’N BAR CITY N.Y. 374, 377 
(1987). 
 11. MILLER CTR. OF PUB. AFFAIRS, supra note 9, at 3; see Carl Tobias, The New Certiorari and a 
National Study of the Federal Appeals Courts, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 1264, 1268–70 (1996). 
 12. E.g., Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 
1796 (1994) (codified as amended in 42 U.S.C. ch. 136); Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 
Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (1990) (codified as amended in 42 U.S.C. ch. 126). 
 13. 28 U.S.C. §§ 44, 133 (2012) (establishing rules for the appointment, tenure, residence, and 
salary of appellate court judges (§ 44), and the appointment and number of district court judges 
(§ 133)); see Judicial Vacancies, supra note 3. 
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confirmation times mounted.14  Appellate court nominations and confirma-
tions consumed, on average, twelve and three months, respectively.15  The 
nomination and confirmation processes’ substantial numbers of phases and 
participants make some delay inherent.16  Presidents consult home state 
elected officials, pursuing advice on choices, and recommend talented sub-
missions.17  The FBI diligently undertakes probing background checks.18  The 
American Bar Association (ABA) comprehensively examines and rates can-
didates.19  The Department of Justice (DOJ) helps survey individuals while 
rigorously preparing nominees for Senate assessment.  The Judiciary Com-
mittee analyzes nominees, stages its hearings, discusses choices, and votes; 
candidates whom the panel reports may acquire floor debates, when required, 
preceding chamber ballots. 
B. The Modern Difficulty 
Article II of the U.S. Constitution envisions that senators will alter erro-
neous nominations, while partisanship has long infected judicial selection.20  
Politicization has distinctly continued, exponentially soaring when President 
Richard Nixon pledged to deliver “law and order” by forwarding “strict con-
structionists,”21 and profoundly increased with U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
 
 14. U.S. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, LONG RANGE PLAN FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS 103 (1995). 
 15. MILLER CTR. OF PUB. AFFAIRS, supra note 9, at 3–4; Bermant et al., supra note 9, at 323.  
Appellate court nominations and confirmations consumed twenty months during 1997, the first year 
of President Bill Clinton’s last term, and 2001, the first year of President George W. Bush’s initial 
term.  Carl Tobias, Curing the Federal Court Vacancy Crisis, 53 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 883, 887 
(2018).  Each of these years resembled President Barack Obama’s first and last two years.  Id. at 887 
n.16. 
 16. Bermant et al., supra note 9, at 321; Sheldon Goldman, Obama and the Federal Judiciary: 
Great Expectations but Will He Have a Dickens of a Time Living up to Them?, 7 FORUM 1, 11 (2009). 
 17. How Judges and Justices are Chosen, U.S. HIST., http://www.ushistory.org/gov/9d.asp (last 
visited Nov. 5, 2019). 
 18. DENIS STEVEN RUTKUS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., THE APPOINTMENT PROCESS FOR U.S. 
CIRCUIT AND DISTRICT COURT NOMINATIONS: AN OVERVIEW 14 (2016), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/mis
c/R43762.pdf. 
 19. MILLER CTR. OF PUB. AFFAIRS, supra note 9, at 5–6; see ABA, STANDING COMM. ON FEDERAL 
JUDICIARY: WHAT IT IS AND HOW IT WORKS (1983). 
 20. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 76, at 513 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob Cooke ed., 1961); MICHAEL 
GERHARDT, THE FEDERAL APPOINTMENTS PROCESS: A CONSTITUTIONAL & HISTORICAL ANALYSIS 
28 (2000); SHELDON GOLDMAN, PICKING FEDERAL JUDGES: LOWER COURT SELECTION FROM 
ROOSEVELT THROUGH REAGAN 6 (1997). 
 21. GOLDMAN, supra note 20, at 208; DAVID O’BRIEN, JUDICIAL ROULETTE: REPORT OF THE 
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District Court of Columbia’s Circuit Judge Robert Bork’s Supreme Court 
fight.22  Mushrooming partisanship, divided government, and the strong hope 
that the party lacking the White House might regain control and confirm ju-
rists fueled delay.  Relatively slow nominations and confirmations may ex-
plain the dearth of approvals in the Clinton and Bush presidencies, which the 
1997 and 2001 selection processes epitomize.23  In President Barack Obama’s 
time, the GOP eroded collaboration, demonstrated by its unprecedented re-
fusal to assess Judge Merrick Garland, Obama’s esteemed High Court nomi-
nee.24  After the GOP won a chamber majority during November 2014, vow-
ing to effectuate “regular order” again, the Republican majority permitted the 
confirmation of merely two Obama appellate court nominees and eighteen 
trial court judges, the least since Harry Truman’s presidency, which resulted 
in more than 100 appellate court and district court openings upon Trump’s 
inauguration, encompassing a lone Illinois seat.25 
 
TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE ON JUDICIAL SELECTION 20 (1988). 
 22. E.g., MARK GITENSTEIN, MATTERS OF PRINCIPLE: AN INSIDER’S ACCOUNT OF AMERICA’S 
REJECTION OF ROBERT BORK’S NOMINATION TO THE SUPREME COURT 1–2 (1992); JEFFREY TOOBIN, 
THE NINE: INSIDE THE SECRET WORLD OF THE SUPREME COURT 18, 310 (2007). 
 23. Tobias, supra note 15, at 888–89 (evaluating judicial appointment issues in the Clinton and 
Bush Administrations). 
 24. See Robin Bradley Kar & Jason Mazzone, The Garland Affair: What History and the Consti-
tution Really Say About President Obama's Powers to Appoint a Replacement for Justice Scalia, 91 
N.Y.U. L. REV. ONLINE 53, 56–57, 98–99 (2016), https://www.nyulawreview.org/wp-content/up-
loads/2018/08/NYULawReviewOnline-91-Kar-Mazzone.pdf; Carl Tobias, Confirming Supreme 
Court Justices in a Presidential Election Year, 94 WASH. U. L. REV. 1093 (2017). 
 25. This occurred because Illinois was President Obama’s home state and the senators cooperated 
with his White House and filled openings by deploying an effective bipartisan merit selection com-
mission, which reviewed applications, interviewed highly-qualified candidates, and tendered recom-
mendations to the senators, who correspondingly submitted recommendations to the White House.  
Confirmation Listing, U.S. CTS., https://www.uscourts.gov/judges-judgeships/judicial-vacancies/con-
firmation-listing (last updated Nov. 5, 2019); 163 CONG. REC. S8,022-24 (daily ed. Dec. 14, 2017) 
(statements of Sens. Durbin, Feinstein & Leahy); see Carl Tobias, The Republican Senate and Regular 
Order, 101 IOWA L. REV. ONLINE 12, 13 (2016), https://ilr.law.uiowa.edu/online/volume-101/the-re-
publican-senate-and-regular-order/ (defining “regular order” and discussing the Republican Senate 
majority’s failure to restore irregular order). 
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III. TRUMP ADMINISTRATION JUDICIAL SELECTION 
A. Nomination Process 
Over the course of the election campaign, Trump vowed to nominate ide-
ological conservatives.26  The Chief Executive acutely honored those prom-
ises by nominating and confirming Justice Neil Gorsuch and Justice Brett Ka-
vanaugh and many similar court of appeals nominees—yet he made 
comparatively few analogous district court nominations.27  The President con-
firmed a record twelve appellate court judges the first year of his presidency, 
with even more during the second.28 
Trump applies a few vaunted traditions but omits or deemphasizes nu-
merous effective conventions.  For instance, Trump accords—as each con-
temporary president has—chief responsibility to White House Counsel (for-
merly Donald McGahn and currently Patrick Cipollone), related duties to the 
Department of Justice, and important responsibility for district court vacan-
cies to home state politicians, while Trump’s emphasis is the appeals courts.29  
When sending appellate court picks, the White House Counsel accentuates 
conservatism and youth while emphasizing the “short list” of potential Su-
preme Court prospects whom the Federalist Society and the Heritage Founda-
tion assembled.30  Those ideas control now because the Federalist Society’s 
 
 26. Carl Tobias, President Trump and Federal Bench Diversity, 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 
400, 410 (2018), https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr-online/vol74/iss2/7. 
 27. Id.; see also Confirmation Listing, supra note 25 (documenting Trump’s nominations during 
his tenure so far). 
 28. Confirmation Listing, supra note 25 (presenting a chart of Trump’s nominations, including 
those in 2017–19).  Trump appointed eighteen more circuit judges in 2018 and has confirmed twenty 
additional court of appeals judges so far this year.  See id. 
 29. Cf. Carl Tobias, Senate Gridlock and Federal Judicial Selection, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
2233, 2239 (2013) (describing Obama’s approach to the judicial selection process); Michael S. 
Schmidt & Maggie Haberman, McGahn, Soldier for Trump and Witness Against Him, Leaves White 
House, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 17, 2018), https://perma.cc/R62E-EYCN (last visited Nov. 4, 2019) (describ-
ing Trump’s tweet which announced the departure of McGahn, who served as the initial White House 
Counsel, and the appointment of Patrick Cipollone, who serves as the second White House Counsel). 
 30. Charlie Savage, Courts Reshaped at Fastest Pace in Five Decades, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12, 2017, 
at A1; see also Donald F. McGahn II, A Brief History of Judicial Appointments From the Last 50 
Years Through the Trump Administration, 60 WM. & MARY L. REV. ONLINE 105, 105–08 (2019) (de-
scribing the way that judicial nominations have been made and how the Senate has confirmed nomi-
nees in the last half century and how nominations and confirmations operated in the Trump Admin-
istration). 
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Executive Vice President, Leonard Leo,31 helps Trump, who stresses appellate 
court nominations, as the appeals courts comprise tribunals of last resort for 
virtually all filings, create more policy than district courts, and issue rulings 
that cover several jurisdictions.32  His appellate court nominees are quite con-
servative, young, and capable. 
Nonetheless, this Chief Executive ignores or dilutes valuable traditions.  
One example is the meaningful consultation with politicians about home state 
openings, a convention which recent presidents distinctly adopted; that was a 
central reason for blue slips, which only permitted hearings when both home 
state politicians dutifully returned slips in Obama’s presidency.33  Democratic 
legislators alleged that the first White House Counsel actually consulted neg-
ligibly about vacant court of appeals slots in jurisdictions which they repre-
sent, and McGahn responded that the Constitution does not expressly allude 
to consultation.34  Most relevantly, a number of Democratic lawmakers argued 
that Trump marshaled appellate court nominees without “adequate consulta-
tion,” although the White House Counsel appeared to robustly consult the Il-
linois Senators Durbin and Duckworth—who astutely deployed a bipartisan 
selection panel which fostered cooperation—before Trump recommended 
able, mainstream nominees for two openings on the Seventh Circuit and four 
vacancies on Illinois district courts.35 
 
 31. See Robert O’Harrow & Shawn Boburg, A Conservative Activist’s Behind-the-Scenes Cam-
paign to Remake the Nation’s Courts, WASH. POST (May 21, 2019), https://www.washing-
tonpost.com/graphics/2019/investigations/leonard-leo-federalists-society-courts/; Zoe Tillman, After 
Eight Years on the Sidelines, This Conservative Group is Primed to Reshape the Courts Under Trump, 
BUZZFEED NEWS (Nov. 20, 2017), https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/zoetillman/after-eight-
years-on-the-sidelines-this-conservative-group. 
 32. See CONG. REC., supra note 25 (providing a statement from Senator Feinstein regarding 
Trump’s conservative nominations).  But see Tobias, supra note 29, at 2240–41 (describing Obama’s 
bipartisan approach to judicial nominations).  See generally GOLDMAN, supra note 20 (discussing the 
selection process for nominating and confirming federal appellate court and district court judges in the 
administrations of all presidents who served between Franklin Roosevelt and Ronald Reagan). 
 33. See Salvador Rizzo, Are Senate Republicans Killing ‘Blue Slip’ for Court Nominees?, WASH. 
POST (Feb. 21, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/fact-checker/wp/2018/02/21/are-sen-
ate-republicans-killing-blue-slip-for-court-nominees.  See generally Judicial Vacancies, supra note 8 
(describing the policy and practice of “blue slips”). 
 34. Thomas Kaplan, Trump is Putting Indelible Conservative Stamp on Judiciary, N.Y. TIMES, 
(July 31, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/31/us/politics/trump-judges.html; Zoe Tillman, 
Here’s How Trump Is Trying to Remake His Least Favorite Court, BUZZFEED NEWS (Mar. 16, 2018), 
https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/zoetillman/heres-who-the-white-house-pitched-for-the-fed-
eral-appeals. 
 35. Tobias, supra note 15, at 898, 911–12, 912 n.166; 164 CONG. REC. S2,635 (daily ed. May 14, 
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A related deviation from many long precedents was Trump’s resolve to 
end American Bar Association involvement with selection.  Presidents after 
Dwight Eisenhower, save Bush, carefully invoked ABA evaluations and rank-
ings in designating candidates, and Obama refrained from picking everyone 
whom it deemed not qualified.36  Trump has chosen nine appellate court and 
district court aspirants who earned that rating; the Senate has confirmed seven 
of these nominees, and the ABA duly ranked most Illinois designees well 
qualified.37 
Trump essentially relies on more customary practices when suggesting 
district aspirants.  For instance, he, like recent presidents, employs home state 
politician submissions while premising manifold nominations on competence 
to address many cases, as Illinois certainly shows.38  Numerous prospects are 
talented candidates who enjoy high ABA ratings,39 but some withdrew, and 
Trump instructed GOP members to cast negative votes on any whom they 
believe unqualified.40 
 
2018) (statement of Sen. Durbin, Member, S. Comm. on the Judiciary); see Hearing to Consider Pend-
ing Nominations Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 115th Cong. (Aug. 22, 2018), https://www.ju-
diciary.senate.gov/meetings/08/22/2018/nominations (suggesting how White House Counsel collabo-
ration with home state senators, such as that witnessed for Illinois appellate court and district court 
vacancies, could make honoring appellate slips less important). 
 36. Adam Liptak, White House Cuts A.B.A. Out of Judge Evaluations, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 1, 2017, 
at A16;  see CONG. REC., supra note 25 (touting the value of ABA evaluations and ratings and Obama’s 
refusal to nominate candidates whom the ABA rated not qualified).  But see infra note 65 and accom-
panying text (Sen. Grassley strongly arguing that the ABA is an external “political organization” that 
should not dictate Judiciary Committee scheduling); Hearing to Consider Pending Nominations Be-
fore the S. Comm. Judiciary (Oct. 30, 2019), https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/meet-
ings/10/30/2019/nominations (Sen. Mike Lee (R-UT) criticizing the ABA as a liberal political organ-
ization and recommending that the White House and the Justice Department end cooperation with the 
ABA in the selection process). 
 37. Standing Committee on the Federal Judiciary: Ratings of Art. III and Art. IV Judicial Nomi-
nees, ABA, https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/government_affairs_of-
fice/webratingchart-trump116.pdf?logActivity=true (last updated Oct. 30, 2019); see Tobias, supra 
note 15, at 893. 
 38. See supra notes 35–37 and accompanying text; see also Carl Tobias, Recalibrating Judicial 
Renominations in the Trump Administration, 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 9, 18–19 (2017) (dis-
cussing how President Trump should consult and cooperate with home state politicians who should 
cooperate with him).  But see Seung Min Kim, Trump’s Judge Picks: ‘Not Qualified,’ Prolific Blog-
gers, POLITICO (Oct. 18, 2017), https://www.politico.com/story/2017/10/17/trump-judges-nominees-
court-picks-243834. 
 39. Texas District Judges Walter Counts and Karen Gren Scholer are valuable examples.  See su-
pra note 38 and accompanying text. 
 40.  Tobias, supra note 15, at 894; Tom McCarthy, Judge Not: Five Judicial Nominees Trump 
Withdrew—and Four Pending, GUARDIAN (Mar. 10, 2019), https://www.theguardian.com/law/2019/ 
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The Chief Executive violates or downplays efficacious tools.  One pre-
dicament with trial court selection is minimally prioritizing the seventy-nine 
vacancies—forty-seven implicate judicial emergencies—in the haste to 
quickly confirm abundant exceedingly conservative, young appellate court ju-
rists.41  Trump promotes fewer judges in states represented by Democrats, 
even though the jurisdictions face many judicial emergencies—notably, Cal-
ifornia’s rampant fifteen, New York’s substantial six, and Illinois’ problem-
atic three.42  The last jurisdiction confronted as many as seven empty posts, 
but Trump failed to provide any nomination until May 2018, has yet to pro-
pose a single nominee for four of the empty posts, and neglected to confirm a 
single jurist until the week of this August’s chamber recess.43  In February of 
last year, Trump proffered Northern District of Illinois Judge Amy St. Eve 
combined with practitioner Michael Scudder, and they won prompt, felicitous 
Seventh Circuit appointment.44  That June, the Chief Executive nominated 
Martha Pacold, Mary Rowland, and Steven Seeger, and a year later nominated 
John Kness whom Trump continues to champion, all mustered for the North-
ern District of Illinois.45 
 
mar/10/judge-not-five-judicial-nominees-trump-withdrew-and-four-pending. 
 41. There is merely one appellate court vacancy, and the opening is an emergency; emergencies 
skyrocketed nationally from twelve to as many as eighty-six.  Judicial Emergencies, supra note 5.  
District court openings overall are twelve percent and the single appellate court vacancy is fewer than 
one percent.  Id. 
 42. Id. (documenting California’s, New York’s, and Illinois’ judicial emergency vacancies).  But 
see President Donald J. Trump Announces Ninth Wave of Judicial Nominees and Tenth Wave of 
United States Attorney Nominees, WHITE HOUSE, OFF. PRESS SEC’Y (Dec. 20, 2017), 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/president-donald-j-trump-announces-ninth-wave-
judicial-nominees-tenth-wave-united-states-attorney-nominees (naming more in “blue” states); infra 
notes 102, 109. 
 43. Empirical data which the Administrative Office of the United States Courts, the federal courts’ 
administrative arm, collects, analyzes, and synthesizes suggest that the Republican Senate majority 
assigns “red” states priority.  Judicial Vacancies, supra note 3 (documenting that merely one in 179 
U.S. Courts of Appeals judgeships is vacant); Confirmation Listing, supra note 25 (in two-GOP sen-
ator states, confirming ninety-six appellate court and district court judges and nominating 108 appel-
late court and district court candidates; in two-Democratic senator states, confirming thirty-five appel-
late court and district court judges and nominating fifty-three appellate court and district court 
candidates); see also infra note 79 and accompanying text. 
 44. See Tobias, supra note 15, at 911–12, 912 n.166 (discussing Amy St. Eve’s and Michael Scud-
der’s nominations and “easy” confirmations). 
 45. President Donald J. Trump Announces Fifteenth Wave of Judicial Nominees, Fourteenth Wave 
of United States Attorney Nominees, and Ninth Wave of United States Marshal Nominees, WHITE 
HOUSE, OFF. PRESS SEC’Y (June 7, 2018), https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/presi-
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A constructive regime which Trump has eschewed or deemphasized is 
improving minority judicial representation.46  For example, he implemented 
nominal action to pursue, canvass, and confirm accomplished, conservative 
ethnic minorities or lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and queer (LGBTQ) 
appellate court and district court choices by, for instance, using diverse selec-
tion employees or insisting that home state legislators tender numbers of mi-
norities.47  Among Trump’s 170 confirmees, twenty-two are persons of color 
and one is a lesbian.48  Among 228 marshaled nominees, thirty-four comprise 
ethnic minorities—sixteen Asian-Americans, eight Latino/as, and nine Afri-
can-Americans (although no one in the last ethnic group received nomination 
for a court of appeals vacancy), and one Jamaican—while merely two nomi-
nees constitute LGBTQ people.49  Of the Illinois aspirants, two excellent sug-
 
dent-donald-j-trump-announces-fifteenth-wave-judicial-nominees-fourteenth-wave-united-states-at-
torney-nominees-ninth-wave-united-states-marshal-nominees/; President Donald J. Trump An-
nounces Judicial Nominations, WHITE HOUSE, OFF. PRESS SEC’Y (Apr. 8, 2019), 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/president-donald-j-trump-announces-judicial-nom-
inations/ (re-nominating judicial candidates Pacold, Rowland, and Seeger); Three Nominations Sent 
to the Senate, WHITE HOUSE, OFF. PRESS SEC’Y (May 6, 2019), https://www.whitehouse.gov/presi-
dential-actions/three-nominations-sent-senate-4/; President Donald J. Trump Announces Judicial 
Nominees, WHITE HOUSE, OFF. PRESS SEC’Y (June 11, 2019), https://www.whitehouse.gov/presiden-
tial-actions/president-donald-j-trump-announces-judicial-nominees-3/ (nominating judicial candidate 
Kness); 165 CONG. REC. S5,228, S5,230 (daily ed. July 31, 2019) (confirming Rowland & Pacold); 
165 CONG. REC. S5,434 (daily ed. Sept. 11, 2019) (confirming Seeger). 
 46. See Carl Tobias, President Trump’s War on Federal Judicial Diversity, 54 WAKE FOREST L. 
REV. 531 (2019); Michael Nelson & Rachel Hinkle, Trump Appoints Lots of White Men to Be Federal 
Judges: Here’s Why It Matters, WASH. POST (Mar. 13, 2018), https://www.washing-
tonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2018/03/12/trump-appoints-lots-of-white-men-to-be-federal-
judges-heres-why-it-matters. 
 47. LGBTQ is openly disclosed sexual preference that a number of candidates, nominees, and 
judges may have not divulged.  LGBTQ persons are considered “minorities” in this piece.  See infra 
note 63. 
 48. Tobias, supra note 46, at 555–56 & n.121; see also Danielle Root et al., Building a More 
Inclusive Judiciary, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Oct. 3, 2019), https://www.americanprogress.org/is-
sues/courts/reports/2019/10/03/475359/building-inclusive-federal-judiciary/ (reporting that only 
16%, or twenty-nine, of Trump’s nominees to date were non-white). 
 49. Tobias, supra note 48, at 557 (documenting that only two nominees were “LGBTQ persons”); 
Hailey Fuchs, Democrats Question the Absence of Black or Hispanic Nominees Among Trump’s 41 
Circuit Court Nominees, WASH. POST (July 8, 2019, 3:17 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/pol-
itics/democrats-question-absence-of-black-or-hispanic-nominee-among-trumps-41-circuit-court-
judges/2019/07/08/e8a50d06-98e9-11e9-a027-c571fd3d394d_story.html. 
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gestions comprise women: Pacold is Asian-American, while Rowland is a les-
bian; but, the chamber delayed their appointments.50 
B. Confirmation Process 
The confirmation system resembles the nomination process’ deleterious 
elements in specific ways, principally by eliminating or modifying rules and 
traditions which have long functioned well.51  This is shown by selective 
amendments of (1) the century-old policy for blue slips—which allow com-
mittee hearings only when both home state lawmakers present slips—and (2) 
panel hearings.52 
In fall 2017, Chuck Grassley (R-IA), as then-Chair of the Judiciary Com-
mittee, articulated a new “circuit exception” for persons without the blue slips 
of two politicians who represent states in which vacancies arise, especially 
when slip retention derives from “political or ideological” opposition.53  
Grassley altered the slip concept to which both the Republican and Demo-
cratic parties had strictly adhered for eight years in Obama’s presidency, the 
most recent, salient precedent.54  This situation clearly deteriorated when the 
Chair decided to process numerous aspirants—even though Trump marginally 
consulted—and Grassley negligibly justified according the Chair (himself) 
major responsibility for determining whether Trump had adequately con-
sulted.55  Grassley and Lindsey Graham (R-SC), his successor as the Chair of 
 
 50. In April, Trump renamed both, who earned July 31 confirmation.  See supra note 45 and ac-
companying text; infra note 111 and accompanying text. 
 51.  See Tobias, supra note 15, at 897. 
 52.  Id. 
 53. 163 CONG. REC. S7,174 (daily ed. Nov. 13, 2017); 163 CONG. REC. S7,285 (daily ed. Nov. 16, 
2017); Hearing to Consider Pending Nominations Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 115th Cong. 
(Nov. 29, 2017), https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/meetings/11/29/2017/nominations (statement of 
Sen. Chuck Grassley, Chair, S. Comm. on the Judiciary); Carl Hulse, Judge’s Death Gives Trump a 
Chance to Remake a Vexing Court, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 7, 2018), https://www.ny-
times.com/2018/04/07/us/politics/trump-reinhardt-ninth-circuit.html. 
 54. As Chair, Grassley stringently enforced that blue slip policy across Obama’s final two years, 
and Patrick Leahy (D-VT) strictly applies this policy throughout the first six years.  Executive Business 
Meeting Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 115th Cong. (Feb. 15, 2018), https://www.judici-
ary.senate.gov/meetings/02/15/2018/executive-business-meeting (statements of Sens. Grassley, 
Chair, & Leahy, Member, S. Comm. on the Judiciary); see Carl Tobias, Senate Blue Slips and Senate 
Regular Order, 37 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. INTER ALIA  1, 1–2 (2018). 
 55. E.g., Executive Business Meeting Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, supra note 54 (state-
ments of Sens. Feinstein & Leahy, Members, S. Comm. on the Judiciary); see Tobias, supra note 54, 
at 23–26 (discussing the idea that little precedent supports the notion of a circuit exception); see also 
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the Judiciary Committee, would not respect Democrats’ blue slips for appel-
late court nominees,56 although substantial positive White House consultation 
of the Illinois senators apparently promoted two Seventh Circuit nominees’ 
expeditious appointments.57 
Grassley proclaimed that blue slips were meant to ensure that the White 
House consults politicians in jurisdictions where openings materialize and to 
safeguard those lawmakers’ prerogatives in court appointments, but the expe-
rienced legislator honored home state politicians’ retention of district court 
slips.58  Nevertheless, Republican members had persistently deployed slips to 
peremptorily exclude Obama’s superb, consensus appeals court nominees 
across 2016 for political or ideological reasons, the exact bases which Grass-
ley as Chair had decried as illegitimate.59  
Republicans, as the Senate majority party, essentially have responsibility 
for the confirmation dilemmas, as the GOP changed and diluted effective 
hearing rules and traditions.  During Trump’s presidency, Republicans have 
provided fifteen hearings for two circuit and four trial court nominees, which 
plainly lacked the minority’s assent; that notion sharply contrasted to three 
 
supra notes 34–35 and accompanying text. 
 56. Hearing to Consider Pending Nominations Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 116th Cong. 
(Feb. 13, 2019), https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/meetings/02/13/2019/nominations (statement of 
Sen. Graham, Chair, S. Comm. on the Judiciary) (characterizing opposition from New York Senators 
Chuck Schumer and Kirsten Gillibrand to two New York Second Circuit nominees, Joseph Bianco 
and Michael Park, as an “ideological dispute” and, therefore, conducting a hearing on those nominees 
who easily secured confirmation); see supra note 22 and accompanying text (discussing the refusal to 
honor slips). 
 57. See supra notes 35, 44 and accompanying text.  The Illinois senators tendered blue slips on 
every Trump appellate court and district court nominee, principally because the White House has as-
siduously consulted the Illinois senators, who have adeptly cooperated by employing a bipartisan merit 
selection commission that helps the senators recommend highly qualified, mainstream candidates to 
the White House.  See supra note 46 and accompanying text. 
 58. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.  Graham, who became Chair in January, vowed to 
follow Grassley’s appellate court and district court blue slip policy, doing so with New York appellate 
court and district court picks.  Executive Business Meeting Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 116th 
Cong. (Feb. 7, 2019), https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/meetings/02/07/2019/executive-business-
meeting; see supra note 56; Eight Nominations and Three Withdrawals Sent to the Senate, WHITE 
HOUSE, OFF. PRESS SEC’Y (Sept. 19, 2019), https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/eight-
nominations-three-withdrawals-sent-senate/ (documenting the withdrawal of Northern District of New 
York nominee Thomas Marcelle purportedly because Sen. Gillibrand did not return her blue slip); 
Robert Gavin & Mike Goodwin, Gillibrand Blocked Judge’s Nomination to the Federal Bench, ALB. 
TIMES UNION (Aug. 29, 2019), https://www.timesunion.com/news/article/U-S-Attorney-in-Albany-
picked-for-federal-14397720.php. 
 59. Many Republican senators offered no reasons for blocking the nominees.  Tobias, supra note 
15, at 899 & n.89. 
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analogous hearings coming in Obama’s eight years—and then, for unusual 
situations, with Republican party consent.60  Most sessions—including that 
for an Eighth Circuit nominee, three Illinois district court nominees, and two 
additional district court aspirants—on none of which the minority party con-
curred—were extremely oversubscribed, yet both Illinois Seventh Circuit ju-
rists’ smooth confirmations arguably had somewhat greater relevance.61  Cer-
tain panel hearings were so packed that senators had no time for probing 
questions.62  Sessions, especially involving these people, seemed accelerated 
while lacking enough care for persons who may assume life tenure.63 
One significant deviation from regular order was Chair Grassley’s deci-
sion to revamp waiting on ABA input before hearings, and even votes, despite 
incessant requests from Dianne Feinstein (D-CA), the Judiciary Committee 
Ranking Member, to have American Bar Association evaluations and ratings 
following the work’s conclusion.64  Grassley asserted that the exogenous po-
litical organization should not drive panel scheduling.65  It, thus, was unsur-
prising that virtually all of the more controversial nominees acquired party-
line reports.66 
 
 60. Id. at 899 & n.91. 
 61. See Hearing to Consider Pending Nominations Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, supra 
note 35 (furnishing little time for probing queries).  For similarly packed hearings, see Hearing to 
Consider Pending Nominations Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, supra note 56; Tobias, 
supra note 15, at 901.  But see Tobias, supra note 15, at 911–12 (providing the example of the smooth 
appellate court hearing and the expeditious, felicitous confirmation process for Seventh Circuit nom-
inees St. Eve and Scudder). 
 62. See, e.g., Hearing to Consider Pending Nominations Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 
supra note 56; Hearing to Consider Pending Nominations Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, supra 
note 35 (furnishing little time for probing queries); see Executive Business Meeting Before the S. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 116th Cong. (Apr. 4, 2019), https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/meet-
ings/04/04/2019/executive-business-meeting (suggesting that Democrats lacked sufficient resources 
to prepare when Senate members were considering substantial numbers of nominees). 
 63. Senators had five minutes to pose queries.  See supra notes 34, 62 (demonstrating the lack of 
care discussed).  Many appellate court and district court nominees delayed by repeating queries, de-
flecting queries, or refusing to say whether they would recuse in cases about issues on which they had 
worked or held extreme views, as seen in a third of Trump nominees having anti-LGBTQ records.  
Tobias, supra note 15, at 900. 
 64. Id. at 900–01. 
 65. Id. at 901 & n.102.  The ABA delivered evaluations and ratings on four New York district 
court nominees on their hearing date but submitted examinations and rankings subsequently for two 
additional nominees who testified at the hearing, id. at 901; however, the ABA delivered evaluations 
and ratings for Illinois appellate court and district court nominees in a timely manner and they were 
strong.  See supra notes 35, 37. 
 66. Tobias, supra note 15, at 901 & n.103. 
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Once nominees secure committee approval, similar dimensions limit ef-
fective review: Democrats require cloture votes and demand roll call ballots 
on myriad nominees; Democratic and Republican party senators constantly 
vote in lockstep; and marshaling the 2013 “nuclear option” means that nomi-
nees can win appointment on majority ballots.67  Elemental were pushing four 
appellate court judges’ debates and chamber votes into one 2017 week 68 and 
pursuing six court of appeals jurists’ confirmations over a 2018 week; both 
transpired after rather cryptic notice.69  Many floor debates’ anemic quality 
resembles that in panel discussions.70 
Republican senators prioritize appellate court over district court appoint-
ments, closing non-emergency and red-state court vacancies while approving 
conservative white males.71  This inattention was not warranted, as district 
court judges constitute the federal bench’s workhorses and resolve most liti-
gation, the emergency category applies in extraordinary circumstances, sena-
tor party affiliation and Trump’s political maneuvers ought not dictate court 
judicial resource distribution, and minority jurists supply numerous benefits.72  
 
 67. Carl Tobias, Filling the D.C. Circuit Vacancies, 91 IND. L.J. 121 (2015).  Cloture ballots and 
roll call votes may stop nominees who lack the requisite qualifications; majority confirmation votes 
can appoint strong judges.  The actions mirror which political party controls the presidency and the 
Senate.  Id. at 135 & n.132. 
 68.  Schedule for Tuesday, Oct. 31, 2017, U.S. SENATE DEMOCRATS (OCT. 30, 2017), 
https://www.democrats.senate.gov/2017/10/30/schedule-for-tuesday-october-31-2017; Schedule for 
Thursday, Oct. 26, 2017, U.S. SENATE DEMOCRATS (OCT. 25, 2017), https://www.democrats.sen-
ate.gov/2017/10/25/schedule-for-thursday-october-26-2017\. 
 69. Schedule for Pro Formas and Monday, May 7, 2018, U.S. SENATE DEMOCRATS (April 26, 
2018 05:38 PM), https://www.democrats.senate.gov/2018/04/26/schedule-for-pro-formas-and-mon-
day-may-7-2018; Schedule for Thursday, April 26, 2018, U.S. SENATE DEMOCRATS (April 25, 2018, 
7:31 PM), https://www.democrats.senate.gov/2018/04/25/schedule-for-thursday-april-26-2018; see 
Tobias, supra note 15, at 902 (suggesting that Democrats’ possessed limited resources to address the 
many appellate court nominees and their substantial records).  But see supra note 35 and accompany-
ing text. 
 70. See sources supra notes 60–63; 165 CONG. REC. S2,220 (daily ed. Apr. 3, 2019) (documenting 
that Republicans detonated the nuclear option to reduce district nominee post-cloture debate time from 
thirty to two hours); Burgess Everett & Marianne Levine, McConnell Preps New Nuclear Option to 
Speed Trump Judges, POLITICO (Mar. 6, 2019), https://www.politico.com/story/2019/03/06/trump-
mcconnell-judges-1205722. 
 71. These priorities in the confirmation regime mirror the nominating system.  See supra notes 28–
37, 41–50.  One of two Illinois Seventh Circuit confirmees is a white male, one of three Northern 
District of Illinois confirmees is and two of four district court nominees are.  Federal Judges Nomi-
nated by Donald Trump, supra note 2. 
 72. See supra notes 38, 41–43, 45 and accompanying text; infra notes 78–88 and accompanying 
text. 
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Those problems were multiplied by the pressing need to fill the High Court 
vacancy and the 103 appellate court and district court openings at Trump’s 
inauguration, each of which Senator Mitch McConnell (R-KY), the Senate 
Majority Leader, clearly instigated.73 
These priorities helped Trump set the court of appeals confirmation rec-
ord across his first half term, but left twenty-plus district court nominees with-
out confirmation, large openings at 2017’s completion and more upon the next 
year’s conclusion, emergencies to profoundly grow, and few “blue” state or 
minority confirmees.74  Illinois’ vacant positions rose from one to seven; ju-
dicial emergencies profusely increased from none to four; Trump only seated 
district court judges on July 31, 2019; all trial level candidates whom the panel 
approved lacked confirmation at 2018’s close but were only resent to senators 
during this May; and Pacold and Rowland now comprise the sole minority 
appointees.75 
In the end, the Illinois appellate court and district court nominee pack-
ages’ constituents might explain why Trump delayed renaming several district 
nominees with reports and how four open posts can still be missing nominees.  
He may have provided two appeals court nominees, while the senators appar-
ently proffered most trial court nominees.76  In short, Trump expeditiously 
proposed and confirmed two appellate court judges with trades, and he con-
firmed three district jurists over a year later, but seemingly delayed or reneged 
on multiple additional district court vacancies.77 
 
 73. Charles Homans, Mitch McConnell Got Everything He Wanted. But at What Cost?, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 27, 2019, at SM 35; Michael Cohen, Mitch McConnell, Republican Nihilist, N.Y. REV. 
BOOKS (Feb. 25, 2019), https://www.nybooks.com/daily/2019/02/25/mitch-mcconnell-republican-ni-
hilist; see MITCH MCCONNELL, THE LONG GAME: A MEMOIR (2016). 
 74. For 2017, see U.S. Senate, Exec. Calendar, Issue No. 188 (Dec. 23, 2017), 
https://www.cop.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/executive_calendar/2017/12_23_2017.pdf; supra notes 
41–50, 71–72.  For 2018, see 165 CONG. REC. D3 (daily ed. Jan. 3, 2019); Judicial Vacancies, supra 
note 3. 
 75. He did confirm them, Seeger, and two able Seventh Circuit judges.  See supra text accompa-
nying notes 35, 44–45. 
 76. Sending slips for two appellate court and four district picks suggests consultation works.  See 
infra notes 119–21. 
 77. For additional information on issues which trades and bipartisan courts raise, see Tobias, supra 
note 15, at 915–18; Zoe Tillman, The White House Has Pitched a Nominee for Manhattan’s Powerful 
US Attorney Opening, BUZZFEED NEWS (Aug. 7, 2017), https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/zoe-
tillman/the-white-house-has-pitched-a-nominee-for-manhattans.  Trump also appeared to torment sen-
ators who represent California, Illinois, and New York by slowly renaming nominees on whom the 
White House and the senators had agreed.  See, e.g., Carl Tobias, Filling the California Ninth Circuit 
Vacancies, 92 S. CAL. L. REV. POSTSCRIPT 83, 99 (2018); see also Judicial Vacancies, supra note 3 
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IV. IMPLICATIONS 
The nomination and confirmation processes’ assessment reveals that cen-
tral ideas, which Trump and the chamber employ, manifest adverse conse-
quences.  Notable markers include the seventy-nine empty trial level seats, 
forty-seven of which implicate emergencies (large numbers affecting both pa-
rameters come from states that Democrats represent), and the minuscule num-
ber of nominees and confirmees who comprise minorities—several nuanced 
points that Illinois exemplifies.78  In fact, until August, the data had eclipsed 
the 103 openings, forty-two of which involved emergencies, at Trump’s inau-
guration.79  The phenomena cause harmful ramifications.80  They squeeze par-
ties and district courts, which must expeditiously, inexpensively, and equita-
bly resolve substantial numbers of filings.81  District judges conclude ample 
civil litigation, and criminal suits receive precedence in the Speedy Trial 
Act.82 
Certain particulars—seventy-nine vacant district slots, five plaguing Illi-
nois, rampant emergencies and comparatively few minority appointees, num-
bers of whom could proffer much—show the necessity to confirm additional 
 
(suggesting that the Republican Senate majority established red-state priorities in confirmations); Hai-
ley Fuchs, As Democrats Debated Without Mentioning Federal Judges, the Senate Confirmed 13 More 
Trump Nominees, WASH. POST (Aug. 1, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/powerpost/as-dem-
ocrats-debated-without-mentioning-federal-judges-13-more-trump-nominees-got-con-
firmed/2019/08/01/d61ccdbc-b465-11e9-8949-5f36ff92706e_story.html (“[T]he Senate confirmed 13 
of President Trump’s judicial nominees, giving Republicans a remarkable 144 judicial appointments 
since his inauguration and allowing him to reshape the courts and their decisions for decades, filling 
them with conservative jurists.”); Tobias, supra note 15, at 906–08 (discussing the implications of the 
confirmation process). 
 78. See Judicial Emergencies, supra note 5; supra notes 41–50 and accompanying text. 
 79. Thirteen district court nominees captured appointment at the August recess.  Fuchs, supra note 
77; see also Tobias, supra note 15, at 906–07 (showing that vacancies worsened, even as status 
changes by judges slowed). 
 80. See Tobias, supra note 15, at 907–08 (“This inattention to diversity’s expansion constitutes a 
lost opportunity for increasing the quality of justice that litigants need.”). 
 81. FED. R. CIV. P. 1; Patrick Johnston, Problems in Raising Prayers to the Level of Rule: The 
Example of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 1, 75 B.U. L. REV. 1325, 1326–27 (1995).  District jurists 
are the sole judges whom most litigants face; protracted vacancies deprive parties and judges of needed 
resources. 
 82. Speedy Trial Act of 1974, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1261–3174; see Joe Palazzolo, In Federal Courts, the 
Civil Cases Pile Up, WALL STREET J. (Apr. 6, 2015), https://www.wsj.com/articles/in-federal-courts-
civil-cases-pile-up-1428343746; see also Gary Fields & John R. Emshwiller, As Criminal Laws Pro-
liferate, More Are Ensnared, WALL STREET J. (July 23, 2011), https://www.wsj.com/arti-
cles/SB10001424052748703749504576172714184601654. 
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diverse jurists.83  Persons of color and LGBTQ individuals can now appear 
overrepresented vis-à-vis the criminal justice system and essentially un-
derrepresented on the judiciary.84  Illinois has perennially been quite diverse, 
which compels enhanced minority representation.  Inattention to diversity was 
a lost opportunity for expanding the quality of justice that litigants need.  More 
representation supplies advantages.  Numerous people of color, women, and 
LGBTQ jurists clearly supply different, informative views 85 that encompass 
issues regarding abortion, criminal procedure, and other complex questions 
that federal judges decide.86  They may restrict ethnic, gender, and sexual pref-
erence biases that undermine justice.87  Tribunals that directly reflect the 
United States population’s diversity also improve respect for courts by 
demonstrating that persons of color, women, and LGBTQ choices serve as 
effective jurists.88 
No important reason could justify the failure to augment diversity.  For 
example, many conservative, accomplished people of color, women, and 
LGBTQ individuals—namely Trump confirmees Gren Scholer, Terry 
Moorer, and Fernando Rodriguez, conjoined with excellent Northern District 
of Illinois Judges Pacold and Rowland, who did not capture appointment until 
July 31—significantly erode the idea that confirming ethnic minority, female, 
and LGBTQ nominees reduces merit.89  His confirmees and nominees to-date 
 
 83. See Judicial Vacancies, supra note 3 (showing the comparatively small number of diverse 
appellate court nominees and the rather substantial number of judicial emergency vacancies in the 
federal district courts). 
 84. Tobias, supra note 15, at 907 (“The federal courts have been an emblematic locus for justice 
where individuals of color, particularly African Americans, Latinos/as, and Native Americans, expe-
rience significant overrepresentation in the criminal justice process, and minorities, women, and 
LGBTQ individuals correspondingly encounter too little judicial representation.”). 
 85. See Theresa M. Beiner, The Elusive (But Worthwhile) Quest for a Diverse Bench in the New 
Millennium, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 597, 610–15 (2003); John McCain & Jeff Flake, Federal Judge 
Diane Humetewa, 40 HUM. RTS., no. 4, 2015, at 22. 
 86. See Jennifer L. Peresie, Note, Female Judges Matter: Gender and Collegial Decisionmaking 
in the Federal Appellate Courts, 114 YALE L.J. 1759, 1776, 1778 (2005).  But see Stephen J. Choi et 
al., Judging Women, 8 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 504, 511 (2011). 
 87. See, e.g., FINAL REPORT OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT TASK FORCE ON RACIAL, RELIGIOUS & 
ETHNIC FAIRNESS 9 (1997); FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE, REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS 
STUDY COMMITTEE 169 (1990), https://www.fjc.gov/sites/default/files/2012/RepFCSC.pdf. 
 88. Sylvia R. Lazos Vargas, Only Skin Deep?: The Cost of Partisan Politics on Minority Diversity 
of the French Bench, 83 IND. L.J. 1423, 1442 (2008); Jeffrey Toobin, The Obama Brief, NEW YORKER 
(Oct. 27, 2014), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/10/27/obama-brief. 
 89. Tobias, supra note 15, at 909 (documenting more able, conservative female confirmees); see 
also supra notes 46–53. 
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indicate that plenty of superb, diverse candidates furnish merit and conserva-
tism.  Trump need only realize this potential. 
The Chief Executive’s violation and deemphasis of critical rules and cus-
toms by quickly approving substantial numbers of conservative, young appel-
late court judges undercut the discharge of presidential constitutional respon-
sibilities to nominate and appoint jurists for the manifold district level 
openings.  Rapid confirmation of analogous choices by diluting blue slips and 
eschewing or confining related profitable notions undermines fulfillment of 
senators’ duties to advise and consent regarding nominees. The remarkable 
quantity and protracted character of trial level vacancies may concomitantly 
impede the judiciary’s swift, economical, and fair disposition of much press-
ing litigation.90 
In sum, Trump has nominated plentiful appeals court and district court 
candidates and seated many appellate court jurists who are exceptionally con-
servative, young, and capable; but, he and the chamber rejected and down-
played cogent approaches, which have recently promoted confirmations, and 
this subjected district courts to seventy-nine openings, forty-seven of which 
constitute judicial emergencies.  Illinois addresses five district vacancies, 
three comprising emergencies; Trump appointed no trial level judge before 
late July.  Thus, the final part surveys practices which might remedy the juris-
diction’s numerous district court vacancies. 
V. SUGGESTIONS FOR THE FUTURE 
Trump must capitalize on efficacious techniques; the President invokes 
some.  One was renominating three district court picks with committee reports 
whose nominations expired in January, but drew April renewal.91  That con-
cept was efficient; those designees have already received intensive panel, FBI, 
 
 90. See supra notes 81–82 and accompanying text.  Incessant ideological emphasis in the judicial 
selection process can make federal judges resemble politicians and erode public trust.  Tonja Jacobi 
& Matthew Sag, The New Oral Argument: Justices as Advocates, 94 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1161, 
1186–88 (2019) (discussing the negative effects of political polarization and the potential to undermine 
public trust in the federal judiciary); Executive Business Meeting Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 
116th Cong. (Mar. 7, 2019), https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/meetings/03/07/2019/executive-busi-
ness-meeting; e.g., Diane Laviolette, Trump Judge Casts the Deciding Vote Denying Parents the Ben-
efits for the Accidental Death of Their Son, PEOPLE FOR AM. WAY: BLOG CONFIRMED JUDGES, 
CONFIRMED FEARS (Nov. 4, 2019), http://www.pfaw.org/blog-posts/trump-judge-casts-the-deciding-
vote-denying-parents-the-benefits-for-the-accidental-death-of-their-son-confirmed-judges-con-
firmed-fears/. 
 91. He renominated fifty-four nominees this January but only sent the Senate April renominees on 
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and ABA scrutiny, which only required cursory updating—and they compile 
easily detected, thorough records—while the nominees must win only com-
mittee and chamber votes, which all did.92  This procedure is effective.  Illinois 
surely needs each trial court jurist to increase justice.  Fairness also can man-
date that nominees receive prompt analysis, every constituent of the Trump-
home-state lawmaker trade be honored, and his continuous political machina-
tions and correspondingly senator party affiliation not dictate court judicial 
resource dissemination.93 
A similar mechanism on which Trump plainly relies is elevating numbers 
of able, consensus magistrate judges whom Article III jurists in the district 
courts approve for eight-year stints.94  The concept is pragmatic and equitable 
because these nominees compile accessible, complete records and bring im-
pressive expertise.95  Illustrations include Moorer, one accomplished, diverse 
Trump confirmee, and Rowland, his exceptional, centrist Northern District of 
Illinois appointee.96 
Trump should revitalize or improve the efficacious constructs that he jet-
tisons and deemphasizes.  Crucial would be assertively consulting home state 
politicians, as White House Counsel robustly did to appoint the Illinois Sev-
enth Circuit judges and perhaps certain Northern District of Illinois selections; 
this practice effectively facilitates many nominations and confirmations and 
is the blue slip’s major purpose.97  Relevant was effortlessly nominating the 
four competent, moderate Illinois district court aspirants.98  Thus, much vig-
orous consultation will not always surface the parties’ strongest preferences 
 
May 21.  See supra note 45. 
 92. All three, who earned hearings in the previous Congress, did not need another.  Tobias, supra 
note 15, at 911. 
 93. See supra notes 35, 44–45 and accompanying text.  Presidents and senators must honor their 
constituents of deals which they consummate or the agreements will unravel.  See, e.g., Burgess Ev-
erett & Marianne Levine, Josh Hawley Rattles Republicans as He Derails GOP Judge, POLITICO (June 
12, 2019), https://www.politico.com/story/2019/06/12/josh-hawley-republican-judges-1362687. 
 94. See President Donald Trump Announces Fifteenth Wave of Judicial Nominees, supra note 45 
(demonstrating Trump’s reliance on elevating Illinois magistrate judges with the appointment of Mary 
M. Rowland as an Article III judge to the Northern District of Illinois). 
 95. See 28 U.S.C. § 631 (2012); Tobias, supra note 15, at 910 (analyzing elevation).  They also 
have FBI background checks. 
 96. See supra notes 45, 50, 75, 89 and accompanying text. 
 97. See supra notes 34–35, 44–45 and accompanying text; supra text accompanying notes 55–59. 
 98. Three had smooth panel approval, no floor vote and April renaming.  Executive Business Meet-
ing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 116th Cong. (June 20, 2019), https://www.judiciary.sen-
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but could essentially spark more fine nominations—as the Illinois appellate 
court and trial court processes show—and may resolve disagreements that can 
erode the processes and interparty cooperation.99  Those attributes suggest the 
exigency for reignition of discussions related to (1) immediately confirming 
the one district court nominee and (2) expediting confirmations to the four 
additional open district posts which have yet to experience nominees but must 
realize them soon. 
Trump should reexamine persistently appointing such a substantial num-
ber of conservative appeals court jurists, which is the predominant explanation 
for the seventy-nine unfilled district positions and Illinois’ seven until this 
July’s conclusion, while carefully reviewing activities to diminish the vacan-
cies.  For example, he might prioritize nominees who may remedy the Illinois 
emergencies.100  Trump could also stress the five Illinois district court open-
ings,101 which might rectify the paucity of blue state confirmees and nomi-
nees.102 
The President can enhance diversity, furnishing the benefits that Pacold 
and Rowland clearly epitomize, which Illinois deserves.103  Trump could ex-
pand representation and convey to all citizens and judicial selection partici-
pants that he supports greater diversity.  The White House Counsel may lead 
this action, communicating that representation should have preference analo-
gous to conservatism.  The importuning’s appropriate emphasis will be his 
staff, the Justice Department, the Senate Judiciary Committee, and the Illinois 
 
ate.gov/meetings/06/20/2019/executive-business-meeting; Three Nominations Sent to the Senate, su-
pra note 45. 
 99. See supra notes 34–35, 42–43, 53–56 and accompanying text (documenting numerous Demo-
cratic senators’ disagreements with the Trump White House). 
 100. See supra notes 42–43, 71–75 and accompanying text. 
 101. See Judicial Vacancies, supra note 3 (showing five Illinois district openings).  California con-
fronts fifteen, New York faces ten and New Jersey addresses six.  Id. (showing the number of judicial 
vacancies remaining across the U.S. in district and appellate courts, including those in California, New 
York, and New Jersey). 
 102. He should continue following proposals of strong picks tendered by senators who represent 
jurisdictions where vacancies arise, but the highly qualified, mainstream Illinois appellate court and 
district court nominees and confirmees arguably suggest that Trump and the Senate may need expert 
ABA input less than other jurisdictions.  See Tobias, supra note 15, at 901 & n.103; supra notes 36–
41 and accompanying text. 
 103. See supra notes 50, 85–88 and accompanying text. 
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politicians, who enlarge diversity by conscientiously seeking out and recom-
mending numerous preeminent, conservative minority attorneys.104  The 
White House Counsel next must interview and forward these candidates, ask-
ing that Trump seriously consider naming all.  Trump then might nominate 
while cautiously persuading legislators to favor and efficiently canvass the 
nominees. 
In short, Trump and the chamber must evaluate near-term ideas which 
may eliminate Illinois district court vacancies and ease the prolonged confir-
mation wars. The latter are reflected with (1) his limited consultation and di-
latory renomination of three trial level choices and substantially delayed nom-
ination of four other candidates for comparatively longstanding district court 
vacancies, (2) Democrats’ rare concurrence about chamber ballots and their 
demand for voluminous cloture and roll call confirmation ballots, and (3) the 
Republican Senate majority’s change of appeals court slips and trial level 
nominees’ post-cloture debate hours.105  Multiple complications suggest that 
2019 is past time for effectuating strictures which permanently improve the 
faltering judicial selection rules and conventions.106 
Trump and the chamber might alter the current system with a bipartisan 
judiciary that permits the specific party which lacks the executive to recom-
mend some percentage of candidates.107  New York senators first deployed 
 
 104. See supra notes 25, 35, 44 (documenting the Illinois senators’ bipartisan merit selection com-
mission’s panel efforts and the lawmakers’ endeavors); see also Carl Tobias, Appointing Lesbian, 
Gay, Bisexual, Transgender and Queer Judges in the Trump Administration, 96 WASH. U. L. REV. 
ONLINE 11, 16, 20–22 (2018), https://cdn.wustllawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/Tobias-Format-
ted.pdf?x10937 (evaluating New York senators’ efforts and proffering additional ideas that can en-
hance diversity). 
 105. See Tobias, supra note 24, at 1107; John Gramlich, Federal Judicial Picks Have Become More 
Contentious, and Trump’s Are No Exception, PEW RES. CTR. (Mar. 7, 2018), https://www.pewre-
search.org/fact-tank/2018/03/07/federal-judicial-picks-have-become-more-contentious-and-trumps-
are-no-exception; supra notes 34–35, 53–57,  67, 70, 74–75. 
 106. Longer-term ideas need 2020 adoption, as limited clarity on who might win presidential and 
senatorial elections offers incentives to agree.  For numerous additional longer-term concepts, see 
Tobias, supra note 29, at 2255–65; Michael L. Shenkman, Decoupling District from Circuit Judge 
Nominations: A Proposal to Put Trial Bench Confirmations on Track, 65 ARK. L. REV. 217, 298–311 
(2012). 
 107. See Michael J. Gerhardt, Judicial Selection As War, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 667, 688 (2003); 
Carl Tobias, Fixing the Federal Judicial Selection Process, 65 EMORY L.J. ONLINE 2051, 2056 (2016), 
http://law.emory.edu/elj/_documents/volumes/65/online/tobias.pdf. 
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that avenue.108  Illinois provides a contemporary example.109  What the state 
recently fashioned may be viewed as bipartisan courts.110  For instance, Trump 
apparently chose the two appellate court nominees and the senators seemingly 
proposed many district court submissions.  The appeals court nomination and 
confirmation processes operated relatively well, and the district court selec-
tion procedures worked rather felicitously, albeit slowly; yet, the confirmation 
practices for most district aspirants seemed to perform less collaboratively—
Trump ameliorated somewhat the last concern with April renomination of the 
three nominees, who then captured late June panel votes and July 31 confir-
mation.111 
The bipartisan judiciary must become effective in 2021.112  That ap-
proach’s creation will supply benefits.  It would afford each party incentives 
to coordinate in the selection process, jurists who bring diverse experience, 
ideology, ethnicity, gender, and sexual preference, and much-needed judicial 
resources for the courts.  Adoption before November 2020 with implementa-
tion during the subsequent year will decrease the possibility that either Re-
publicans or Democrats can realize unfair advantage; but, this might need 
care,113 as institution may be complex.114  
 
 
 
 108. Tobias, supra note 15, at 915–16.  The New York senator whose party lacked the White House 
originally tapped one in four candidates, which subsequently became one in three picks.  Id. at 915–
16 n.182. 
 109. Pennsylvania, Florida, and New York use similar regimes.  Id. at 916; see also supra notes 44–
45, 50, 77 (agreeing on four California, seven New York, and three Illinois district court nominees 
whom Trump renamed in January and April). 
 110. See supra note 35 and accompanying text (discussing the nomination process which is em-
ployed in Illinois). 
 111. See Executive Business Meeting Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, supra note 98.  For 
more specifics on a bipartisan judiciary and trading, such as the possibility of senators and Trump each 
proposing two candidates to fill Illinois district court vacancies, see supra notes 45, 77, 107 and ac-
companying text. 
 112. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.  When the parties agree before elections, they do 
not know which may benefit. 
 113. Tobias, supra note 15, at 917–18 (analyzing a number of the particular issues that can arise 
with a bipartisan judiciary). 
 114. Congress can address specific concerns.  See id. at 918.  Some conventions, encompassing 
votes on substantial numbers of excellent, consensus district nominees at Senate recesses, could help 
to restore regular order.  Cf. Tobias, supra note 54, at 31 (“Democratic and Republican party members 
should follow recent slip procedures deployed in President Obama’s years and codify them in the 
panel rules.”). 
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Should those activities prove ineffective, because the GOP undercuts 
Democrats’ judicial selection endeavors,115 the minority party could apply a 
number of relatively dramatic remedies.  Promising ideas emanate from blue 
slips, despite problematic restraints which govern appellate courts.116  Demo-
crats might wish to retain slips regarding numerous district court picks from 
home states until Trump proposes any candidates whom they may support.  
The Illinois politicians encouraged his renaming of the three nominees, which 
Trump finally did, but Illinois has four other empty trial level slots that they 
can insist persons whom each senator recommends fill.117  Another potential 
solution is trades.118  For example, the Illinois court packages suggest that 
Trump and the lawmakers proffered several prospects.119  He confirmed two 
appellate court jurists favored by the legislators, who apparently sent most 
trial court picks.120  Nevertheless, “judge trading” might foster detrimental ef-
fects, as the President could only rename in April three district court submis-
sions who had 2018 panel reports and confirm two at July’s close with a third 
in early September and has yet to proffer one nominee who may be seated in 
four existing openings, but the appellate court possibilities did win fast ap-
pointment.121  Similar issues plague Senate effort’s “boycotting,” which can 
 
 115. Slowly renominating three district court nominees, delay in nominating four additional district 
court prospects, and not honoring appellate court slips demonstrate Republican Senate majority ero-
sion of Democrats’ work and selection process rules and customs.  See supra note 98 and accompa-
nying text. 
 116. See supra notes 53–57.  I rely below on ideas espoused by Christopher Kang, who headed 
much of Obama’s judicial selection effort.  Jeremy Stahl, Republicans Are Abolishing Judicial Ap-
pointments Norms Again, SLATE (Feb. 22, 2019), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2019/02/trump-
judicial-appointments-mcconnell-democrats-chris-kang.html. 
 117. Democrats may also retain all district court slips until Republicans agree to honor appellate 
court slips.  Stahl, supra note 116; see also Everett, supra note 70 (discussing Sen. Schumer’s offer to 
honor appellate court slips for two-hour district court nominee debates but the Republican Senate ma-
jority refused); supra notes 34–35, 53–57.  Collective action’s leverage with seventy-nine district court 
and one appellate court opening may prompt Republicans to agree.  See Stahl, supra note 116 (dis-
cussing Democrats’ power to withhold district court blue slips, by which Sen. Graham has frequently 
stated he would abide). 
 118. See Tobias, supra note 15, at 915–18; supra notes 44–45, 77, 107 and accompanying text. 
 119. Trades, bipartisan courts, and the above paragraph’s concepts overlap.  See supra notes 107–
17. 
 120. Judge St. Eve was a Bush district court appointee who seems rather centrist, as does Judge 
Scudder.  Tobias, supra note 15, at 911–12, 912 n.166; see supra notes 57, 76–77 (showing that con-
sulting works).  The district nominees are more moderate. 
 121. See Tobias, supra note 29, at 2260 (providing an example of judge trading); Everett, supra 
note 93 (providing a more recent example); supra notes 43–44, 57, 76–77, 111.  Even if Trump nom-
inates candidates to fill the four vacancies, the Senate would confirm them after many other nominees, 
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publicize and clarify GOP obstruction’s negative impacts, although boycotts 
could seem defeatist and the predicaments they cause might surpass the ben-
efits.122 
VI. CONCLUSION 
President Trump and the Senate have exacerbated the confirmation wars 
raging across the country, particularly states which Democratic senators rep-
resent.  Illinois has been a prominent front, which exquisitely illuminates the 
system-wide miasma, prominently exemplified by his delayed renaming of 
the three district court nominees and failure to marshal nominees for the mul-
tiple remaining trial court vacancies that currently lack nominees.  However, 
the White House appeared to meaningfully consult the Illinois senators, who 
actively cooperated when deftly and easily helping choose and confirm two 
able, consensus Illinois appeals court nominees and rather expeditiously for-
warded three highly talented, mainstream district court nominees; all of these 
district candidates recently won confirmation.  Thus, the President and sena-
tors must collaborate to promptly approve the one nominee left while imple-
menting concerted actions that confirm accomplished, moderate judges to the 
other four unoccupied slots.  Those endeavors can fill all Illinois district court 
openings, enable it to avoid certain pitfalls which numbers of states have en-
countered, and map a constructive route for bipartisan appointments nation-
wide. 
 
if at all, because plentiful nominees are currently in the queue and 2020 is a presidential election year 
when confirmations slow and halt.  Thus, trades should be reserved for dire situations. 
 122. Thus, boycotts ought to be a last resort.  See Stahl, supra note 116. 
